A well established belief both in the game-theoretic IO and in policy debates is that market concentration facilitates collusion. We show that this piece of conventional wisdom relies upon the assumption of pro…t-seeking behaviour, for it may be reversed when …rms pursue other plausible goals. To illustrate our intuition, we investigate the incentives to tacit collusion in an industry formed by Labor-Managed (LM) enterprises. We characterize the perfect equilibrium of a supergame in which LM …rms play an in…nitely repeated Cournot game. We show that the critical threshold of the discount factor above which collusion is stable (i) is lower in the LM industry than in the capitalistic one; (ii) monotonically decreases with the number of …rms.
Introduction
It is well widely accepted from both the industrial organization literature (Tirole, 1988 ) and policy reports (Ivaldi et al., 2003) that high market concentration is a facilitating factor for (tacit as well as explicit) collusion. In addition to coordination being likely more di¢ cult in larger groups, the intuition that the incentive to collusion shrinks with too many competitors is fairly simple.
"Since …rms must share the collusive pro…t, as the number of …rms increases each …rm gets a lower share of the pie. This has two implications. First, the gain from deviating increases for each …rm since, by undercutting the collusive price, a …rm can steal market shares from all its competitors; that is, having a smaller share each …rm would gain more from capturing the entire market. Second, for each …rm the long-term bene…t of maintaining collusion is reduced, precisely because it gets a smaller share of the collusive pro…t. Thus the short-run gain from deviation increases, while at the same time the long-run bene…t of maintaining collusion is reduced. It is thus more di¢ cult to prevent …rms from deviating." (Ivaldi et al., 2003, p. 12) The entire argument is put forward in terms of pro…ts. However, many industries host also …rms interested in other goals. Publicly owned …rms and cooperative (sometimes labeled as Labor-Managed) …rms are the most relevant instances of such non-pro…t seeking organizations. The question we address in this paper deals precisely with the relationship between …rms' maximand and tacit collusion. Even more precisely, what happens in a repeated game when …rms maximize goals other than pro…ts? Do properties holding under pro…t-seeking behaviour still hold true in another plausible setting?
Among the …rms that are supposed to care about goals other than profits, we shall consider the so-called Labor-Managed (LM ) …rms, sometimes de…ned as cooperatives or workers' …rms. Their presence is important in many countries and their performance is still under scrutiny by scholars and practitioners. 1 Moreover, in many European countries we are observing a resurgence of interest in cooperative …rms because they seem to perform better than conventional …rms in responding to the long slump (Delbono and Reggiani, 2013 Hill and Waterson (1983) are probably the …rst to study an oligopolistic industry formed by workers …rms only. They prove that the Cournot equilibrium of such an industry is associated with a lower level of total output (and higher price) that the corresponding entrepreneurial (i.e., pro…t-maximizing) industry. Since then, the literature on LM …rms in pure or mixed oligopolies has been growing rapidly, 3 but to the best of our knowledge all models assume non-cooperative behavior by all participants. 4 2 To be more precise, the short run objective function of such …rms is taken as revenue, net of …xed costs, per worker. Sertel (1982) de…nes as "workers' enterprise" the case in which workers coincide with members of LM …rm. 3 To the best of our knowledge, the …rst papers modelling explicitly oligopolistic interaction between labour-managed …rms and capitalistic …rms are Horowitz (1991), Cremer and Cremer (1992) and Delbono and Rossini (1992) . 4 The only exception is Ohnishi (2012) . He models a two-stage game in which LM …rms choose whether to o¤er a donative most-favored nation policy in the …rst stage and then compete in prices. The kind of questions addressed in this paper makes its conclusions not comparable with ours. At any rate, Ohnishi does not investigate the relationship between
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section 2. Section 3 presents the benchmark case of implicit collusion among Cournottian pro…t-maximisers. Section 4 models the repeated game among LM …rms and establishes our core results. Section 5 concludes.
The setup
Consider a market for a homogeneous good, served by N = 1; 2; :::n identical …rms, all endowed with the same technology. Let the market exist over discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; :::1: In any period, the inverse market demand function is p = a Q; Q = P n i=1 q i : The only variable input is labour, and …rm i's output is q i = l i ; where l i is the amount of labour employed in …rm i and > 0. 5 Hence, choosing l i is equivalent to choosing q i ; and the game can be thought of as being a Cournot one. Let the unit wage be w 2 (0; a) : Additionally, each …rm has to bear an exogenous …xed cost F > 0 (say, a production license) to operate at any t.
In the remainder, we shall consider two alternative scenarios, in which all …rms are either entrepreneurial pro…t-seeking units, or labour-managed enterprises. In the …rst case, each of them sets l i so as to maximise its pro…ts
In the second case, each …rm sets l i in order to maximise its value added per worker/member
Clearly, if v i < w, workers do prefer to quit and o¤er their labour to capitalistic …rms.
market concentration and collusive strategies. 5 If L i is the number of workers (coinciding with the number of members) in …rm i and i is the number of hours worked per person in the same …rm, then l i = L i`i : Therefore, any variation in l i might be due to a variation of either L i or`i; or both.
In both cases, the fully noncooperative Nash equilibria of the constituent subgame are easily characterised. Consider …rst the population of pro…t seekers. The relevant …rst order condition (FOC) is
Imposing symmetry on choice variables, the above FOC simpli…es as follows:
which yields l N = (a w) = (n + 1) 2 ; where superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium, while subscript stands for pro…t-seeking. The resulting individual equilibrium pro…ts are
If instead all …rms are labour-managed …rms, the individual FOC is
so that l N LM = p F = ; with the subscript LM revealing that we are looking at a labour-managed unit. 6 The value added at the Nash equilibrium is
It is intuitively true that shrinking l i by all …rms would increase both pro…ts and the value added; hence, the industry might exploit the repetition of the constituent game over an in…nite horizon so as to build up an implicit cartel, if …rms'time preferences allow them to do so. Let 2 [0; 1] measure the discount factor, taken to be common to all …rms and time-invariant. In the remainder, we will characterise the stability condition for full collusion along the monopoly frontier in both scenarios, using the perfect folk theorem (Friedman, 1971 ) with grim trigger strategies.
Tacit collusion among pro…t-seekers
The implicit cartel sets the vector l fl 1 ; l 2 ; :::l n g to maximise full monopoly pro…ts M = P n i=1 i ; so that the relevant FOC writes as follows:
At the symmetric collusive equilibrium, l C = (a w) = 2n 2 and the individual share of cartel (monopoly) pro…ts is
The optimal unilateral deviation from the cartel path, l D l C ; solves
In the perfect folk theorem (Friedman, 1971 ), the punishment triggered by any deviation from the collusive path is the in…nite Nash reversion involving pro…ts N forever. The resulting minimum value of the discount factor above which full collusion is stable is
It is then easily veri…ed that in (11) is concave and monotonically increasing in n. It can also be checked that = 9=17 when n = 2; which is the standard result reported in textbook examples where duopoly is usually taken as benchmark.
The foregoing analysis boils down to a well know claim, which is a synthesis of the acquired wisdom on the e¤ect of cartel size on the stability of implicit collusion among pro…t-seekers:
Proposition 1 A tacit cartel made up by n pro…t-seeking …rms becomes progressively more unstable as n increases.
The intuitive explanation behind Proposition 1 is that, as n grows larger, the individual share of cartel pro…ts shrinks monotonically and therefore implicit collusion becomes harder to sustain (cf. Tirole, 1988; and Ivaldi et al. 2003 , inter alia).
Tacit collusion among labour-managed …rms
Now suppose the cartel is made up by n LM …rms. If so, the tacit cartel sets the vector l fl 1 ; l 2 ; :::l n g to maximise V M = P n i=1 v i ; so that the relevant FOC writes as follows:
The symmetric tacitly collusive equilibrium is l C LM = p F = ( p n ) and the corresponding individual …rm's value added is
The optimal unilateral deviation from the cartel path,
since LM …rms'reaction functions are orthogonal to each other. The unilateral deviation payo¤ is
which is higher than v M appearing in (13) . Under the grim trigger strategies of the perfect folk theorem (Friedman, 1971) , the critical threshold for cartel stability is
which is evidently convex and monotonically decreasing in n. Hence, the analysis of the supergame among LM …rms reveals the following:
Proposition 2 An increase in cartel size makes implicit collusion among labour-managed …rms easier to sustain.
Proof. It su¢ ces to observe that the derivative of LM = 1= (1 + p n) w.r.t. n is negative everywhere.
The interpretation of Proposition may bene…t from some algebra. To evaluate the e¤ect of a change in n on the sustainability of implicit collusion among LM …rms, let us rewrite the above critical threshold of the discount factor as
Treating n as a continuous variable, we have that
and
Concerning (19), we have
As for (20), we have
Therefore, @ LM =@n < 0 as a result of
Inequality (23) compares the rates at which the numerator and denominator of LM change as n varies. What (23) says is that the denominator of LM increases in n more rapidly than its numerator; hence, LM declines as n grows. With LM …rms we then obtain a reversal of the standard conclusion holding under pro…t-maximising behaviour which is summarised by @ =@n > 0 since, from (11), we have:
Then, we may claim Proposition 3 If the intensity of the punishment increases in n more (resp., less) rapidly than the incentive to deviate from the cartel, then the critical threshold of the discount factor decreases (resp., increases) monotonically in the number of cartel members.
It is worth investigating the curvature and the limit properties of both LM and . Simple algebra shows that
for all n > 2. Moreover,
In words, the critical threshold for LM …rms is decreasing and convex in n and tends to zero as n becomes arbitrarily large. On the other hand, the critical threshold for pro…t-seeking …rms is increasing and concave in n and tends to one as n becomes arbitrarily large. To complete the description of the behaviour of the critical thresholds w.r.t. n, we may also observe that
Figure 1 below illustrates the above properties of the critical levels of the discount factors. The properties we have just highlighted take us to our …nal result, according to which tacit collusion is more likely to be expected in an LM industry than in a capitalistic one.
Proposition 4
> LM for all n 2:
The intuition behind Proposition 4 relies upon the di¤erence in …rms'objective functions. To be more precise, while pro…t seekers aim at maximising total pro…ts, LM …rms maximise pro…t per worker/member. Therefore, as n grows, the incentive to collude intensi…es for LM …rms while the opposite occurs for pro…t-seeking units.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the relationship between cartel stability and cartel size depends upon …rms'goals. While under pro…t-maximising behaviour expanding cartel size diminishes cartel stability, the opposite applies if …rms maximise individual value added. Therefore, under the same conditions concerning demand and technology, we should expect tacit collusion occurring more likely in an LM industry than in a capitalistic one.
We believe that our model might fruitfully be extended in a few directions which we are currently exploring. The …rst one amounts to considering price instead of quantity as …rms'choice variable in a di¤erentiated oligopoly. The second consists in replacing the perpetual Nash reversion with one-shot stick and carrot optimal punishments à la Abreu (1986) . The third amounts to considering an industry in which pro…t-seeking and LM …rms cohabit, and scrutinising the emergence of tacit collusion in such a mixed oligopoly.
